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Abstract
We show that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated RDand competition is not
fundamental, but hinges on the nature of RDspillovers. As a consequence, RDsubsidies may
be more effective than previously thought.
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1 Introduction
The economics of R&D offer a congregation point for most forms of market
imperfections, be they large fixed costs, uncertainty, or externalities. The
design of optimal policies thus turns into a challenging exercise. In partic-
ular, the conflict between marginal cost pricing and the free-rider problem
associated with R&D spillovers calls for a policy that can restore the firms’
incentives to engage in R&D, while simultaneously maintaining a competitive
environment.
In a seminal paper, Spence (1984) showed that when firms independently
invest in R&D, social welfare eventually decreases as the number of firms
increases. Intuitively, this important result is driven by the interaction of
three effects: while competition increases with the number of firms and forces
firms to price closer to marginal cost, losses attributable to both free-riding
on other firms’ R&D and duplication of R&D efforts increase.
He also showed that firms’ incentives to undertake R&D could be fully
restored through appropriate R&D subsidies. Surprisingly, however, because
losses due to duplication alone can outgrow the benefits from increased com-
petition, his result continues to hold even when optimal R&D subsidies elimi-
nate free-riding behavior. This result suggests a fundamental incompatibility
between R&D and a competitive environment when firms are not allowed to
coordinate their R&D efforts.
In light of the presumed incompatibility between independent, uncoordi-
nated R&D and a competitive environment, and in the wake of Spence’s semi-
nal paper, alternative solutions combining competition in the product market
with cooperation in the R&D sector have been proposed. These solutions to
the externality problems associated with R&D, such as R&D cooperative
agreements or Research Joint Ventures (RJV), have been pioneered by the
seminal works of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller,
and Zang (1992).1 In this literature, firms invest in R&D in a first stage and
engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition is a second stage. Whereas R&D
coordination alleviates free-riding by internalizing externalities, RJVs have
the additional benefit of solving the duplication problem, because members
fully share the results of R&D.
Since they simultaneously solve all three problems, namely allocative ef-
1The large subsequent literature includes Vonortas (1994), Martin (1996, 2002), Leahy
and Neary (1997), Amir and Wooders (1988), and Amir, Evstigneev, and Wooders (2003).
For excellent surveys, see De Bondt (1997) and Martin and Scott (1998).
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ficiency, free-riding, and duplication, RJVs would appear to unambiguously
dominate Spence’s subsidy-based solution. However, Hinloopen (1997, 2000)
shows that in the case of symmetric duopolies, the subsidization of non-
cooperative R&D is more effective than R&D cartels or RJVs. Still, in light
of Spence’s result, it is not clear whether Hinloopen’s finding would continue
to hold as the number of firms —and the related duplication problem— in-
creases. In this paper, we show that the purported incompatibility between
R&D and a competitive environment is not fundamental, but hinges on the
nature of the R&D technology.
Amir (2000) showed that the modeling choices for R&D processes used
in the literature fall into two categories: either –as is the case in Spence–
spillovers are in R&D input (or R&D investments), or they are in R&D
output (or knowledge created) as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). We
show that if spillovers are in output, rather than in input, the inefficiency
associated with duplication of R&D effort unambiguously decreases with the
number of firms. As a consequence, a subsidy-based policy can fully solve
the externality problems associated with R&D.
2 The Main Result
We show here that Spence’s result, namely that as the number of firms
increases, the losses from duplication eventually outweigh the gains from
allocative efficiency, hinges on the choice of R&D technology.2
More formally, let the constant marginal cost of production for each firm
be given by
c = A− r(x, n, β), (1)
where A is the constant marginal cost of production in the absence of R&D
and where the amount of cost-reduction r is a function of the amount of
R&D investment x, the number of firms n, and the R&D spillover parameter
β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1).
Suppose then that x dollars are to be allocated equally among the n
independent research labs. Under input-side spillovers, the cost-reduction
2It is important to note that we are working in the context of optimal subsidies with a
fully alleviated free-rider problem.
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function can be written as
r(x, n, β) = f
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where the R&D production function f is assumed to be both increasing
and concave, reflecting diminishing returns to R&D expenditures. Clearly,
r(x, n, β) is decreasing in n. The efficiency with which an industry thus
achieves a certain amount of cost reduction decreases with the number of
firms.
If, on the other hand, spillovers are in R&D output, then each firm’s cost
reduction function can be written3
r = f
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It is now straightforward to show that dr
dn
> 0 if
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f ′(x/n), (4)
which reduces to
f(x/n)
x/n
> f ′(x/n) (5)
as n → ∞. Since f is concave, inequality (5) is satisfied for n sufficiently
large. Note that for some specific functions, inequality (4) may even hold
for all n. For example, if f(·) = √·, as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s
original model, it is easy to show that inequality (4) will be satisfied as long
as β > 1/(1 + n).
We therefore conclude that, provided spillovers in R&D output are not
too small, the efficiency with which an industry achieves a certain amount of
cost reduction increases with n. Since allocative efficiency increases with n
as well, market performance unambiguously improves.
3We justify this expression as follows: Simply let the cost of an amount yi of R&D
undertaken by firm i be C(yi), with C strictly convex and C(0) = 0, and define f(·) ≡
C−1(·). If xi ≡ C(yi) denotes the amount of dollars invested in R&D by firm i, then firm
i’s cost reduction can be written as ri = f(xi) + βf(xj), where f is strictly concave since
C is strictly convex. For example, if C(yi) = y2i ≡ xi, as d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) assumed, we obtain ri =
√
xi + β
√
xj .
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3 Conclusion
We showed that even though both technologies exhibit diminishing returns to
R&D expenditures, they lead to diametrically opposite policy implications.
If spillovers are in R&D output, the incompatibility between competition and
uncoordinated R&D disappears, performance unambiguously improves with
the number of firms, and Spence’s subsidy-based solution becomes a viable
alternative to Research Joint Ventures.
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